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INVESTMENT AT AN IMPASSE: RUSSIA’S
PRODUCTION-SHARING AGREEMENT LAW
AND THE CONTINUING BARRIERS TO
PETROLEUM INVESTMENT IN RUSSIA
I. INTRODUCTION
The Soviet Union was once one of the world’s largest producers
of oil.1  By the time it collapsed in 1991, however, the Soviet Union
had already faced years of declining oil production due to a lack of
capital investment and an eroding infrastructure.2  Although the Rus-
sian Federation inherited most of the former Soviet Union’s oil re-
serves, it has been unable to exploit these resources as both new
drilling sites and investment capital become increasingly hard to
find.3  Without a massive infusion of capital, Russia will be unable to
find and produce the oil it needs both to fuel domestic industry and
to export in return for hard currency.4
Because of Russia’s limited resources, its policy makers have
turned to foreign investment to acquire the capital, management ex-
pertise, and technology needed to revitalize domestic oil production.
However, these same policy makers have frustrated Russia’s interest
in foreign investment by erecting nearly insurmountable legal barri-
ers to foreign investment.5  Perhaps the largest barrier is the fact that
there is no law which deals specifically with foreign investment in
1. See Gary B. Conine, Petroleum Licensing: Formulating An Approach for the New Rus-
sia, 15 HOUS. J. INT’L. L. 317, 319 (1993).  In 1991 the Soviet Union was the world’s largest
producer of both crude oil and natural gas.  Perhaps less well known is that Russian oil produc-
tion rivaled and even “eclipsed” that of the U.S. during the 1870s, making it the world’s largest
oil producer for a short while during the last century.  See id. at 320.
2. See Isabelle Gorst & Andrei Rumyantsev, A Wild West in the East: Investors Brave
Risks, DELOVYE LYUDI, May 29, 1995, at 3.
3. See Conine, supra note 1, at 319.
4. See generally Gorst & Rumyantsev, supra note 2, at 3.  The World Bank estimates that
Russia will need US $20-25 billion over the next ten years to fund exploration efforts, modern-
ize refineries, repair or replace pipelines, and develop other necessary infrastructure.  See id.
5. For purposes of this Note, “foreign investment” is used narrowly to refer only to in-
vestment in Russian oil.  Similarly, the term “foreign investors” will be used, as it is in Russian
legislation, to refer to international oil companies capable of initiating and sustaining large
scale oil exploration and extraction projects.
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Russian oil.6  Until a comprehensive law regulating oil is passed, for-
eign investment will be governed by a patchwork of decrees and laws
which foreign investors find confusing, contradictory, and hostile to
their interests.  Most notable among these laws are the Law on For-
eign Investment7 and the Law on Subsoil Resources8 which, although
intended to encourage and facilitate foreign investment, have only
added to the existing legal morass.
One redeeming feature of the Law on Subsoil is that it alludes to
the need for a law on production-sharing agreements (PSA law).9  A
PSA law would enable the state and investors to conclude production
sharing agreements (PSA contracts) similar to those used around the
world since the 1960s.  In a PSA contract, a host country grants a for-
eign investor the right to explore and develop a specified area for a
limited duration of time, in exchange for a percentage of the actual
oil produced.10  Similarly, the host country covenants to accept a per-
centage of oil in lieu of taxes and to shield the investor from super-
vening legislation which could render the project unprofitable.  The
primary appeal of a PSA contract, however, is that it enables the
state and the investor to conclude a self-contained contract which
disengages the terms of the agreement from the hostile legal regime
of the host country.11
On December 30, 1995, President Yeltsin signed Russia’s Law
on Production-Sharing Agreements.12  Although it is modeled after
6. There are two drafts of a comprehensive oil and gas law currently being considered by
the Russian legislature.  One draft was sponsored by the Fuel and Energy Ministry and the
other by the Russian oil industry.  See Kevin J. Vaughan, Russia’s Petroleum Industry: An
Overview of Its Current Status, the Need For Foreign Investment, and Recent Legislation, 25
LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 813, 832 (1994).
7.  		 
    [Law of the Russian
Federation On Foreign Investments], adopted July 25, 1991, MOSCOW SOVETSKAYA ROSSIIYA,
July 25, 1991, at 3 [hereinafter Law on Foreign Investment].  See infra Part III.A. for a more
detailed discussion concerning the Law on Foreign Investment.
8.  		 
 o  [Law of the Russian Federation on Subsoil],
adopted February 21, 1992, reprinted in 3 ACREAGE, LAWS & TAX (PETROCONSULTANTS) VI-
R-2, at 1 [hereinafter Law on Subsoil].
9. Law on Subsoil, supra note 8, art. 12.
10. See Ernest E. Smith & John S. Dzienkowski, A Fifty-Year Perspective on World Petro-
leum Arrangements, 24 TEX. INT’L L.J. 13, 28 (1989).
11. A PSA contract is “self-contained” in that it is only governed by its own provisions and
the provisions of the PSA law.  This allows the investor to be certain about his legal rights and
obligations before committing significant capital investment to a new oil project.  See generally
James W. Skelton Jr., Investing in Russia’s Oil and Gas Industry: The Legal and Bureaucratic
Obstacles, 8 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T. 26 (1993).
12.  		 
 o     [Law of the Rus-
sian Federation “On Production Sharing Agreements”], approved by the Federation Council
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successful PSA laws enacted in countries around the world, Russia’s
PSA law fails to provide the certainty and protection foreign inves-
tors require before undertaking multi-billion dollar investment proj-
ects.13  The chief problem with Russia’s PSA law is that it does not
allow the state and the investor to conclude a self-contained agree-
ment.  In fact, the PSA law refers directly to both the Law on Foreign
Investment and the Law on the Subsoil, effectively shackling any
PSA contract to Russia’s hostile legal environment.
Part II of this Note discusses the benefits of foreign investment
to both Russia and foreign investors.  Part III demonstrates how for-
eign investment is frustrated by Russia’s current legal environment.
Part IV analyzes Russia’s PSA law and explains how it fails to correct
the problems associated with the current legal environment.  Finally,
Part V discusses the legislative alternatives available to Russian pol-
icy makers, including amending the PSA law.
II. THE BENEFITS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
A. Benefits to Russia
Russia has turned to foreign investment twice this century to
boost sagging domestic oil production.  In 1921 Lenin was able to at-
tract sufficient foreign capital to salvage Russia’s oil industry which
had experienced a decline in production by fifty percent in the pre-
ceding four years.14  With the help of foreign capital and expertise, oil
production in Russia was restored to its pre-war level by 1928.15
When oil production began to slide in the mid 1970s, Russia (the So-
viet Union) once again invited foreign investors to participate in the
location and development of Russia’s oil reserves.16  As before, for-
eign investment reversed the trend of declining production.  By 1987,
Russia had established itself as one of the world’s largest producers
                                                                                                                                     
on December 19, 1995, Ross. Gazeta, January 11, 1996, at 3 [hereinafter Law on Production
Sharing Agreements].
13. Initial investments exceeding US $1 billion are becoming common in the global search
for new oil reserves.  See Rajpreet Basi, Foreign Investment in the Russian Oil and Gas Indus-
try: A Time For Reckoning, 5 INT’L LEGAL PERSP., Summer 1993, at 33, 45 n.82.
14. See Conine, supra note 1, at 325.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 336-38.  Two major projects resulted from Russia’s invitation to foreign in-
vestors.  In 1977, the Japanese Petroleum Development Corporation began exploratory drilling
off the coast of the Sakhalin Island and a Canadian-Soviet joint venture called Vosei 100 began
drilling north of the Komi Republic.
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of oil with a production rate of 11.38 million barrels per day.17  Since
1987, however, Russian oil production has fallen about thirteen per-
cent a year to the current low of 6.1 million barrels a day, which is
very close to the output needed for domestic consumption alone.18
Declining oil production in Russia is extremely dangerous for
two reasons.  First, Russia depends on oil export revenues as its main
source of hard currency.19  Russia needs hard currency to pay interest
to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and a host of foreign
commercial banks.  Declining oil revenues would jeopardize Russia’s
ability to service its debt and could ultimately lead to default.  The
Russians also need hard currency to import basic necessities.  Each
year Russians import fifteen to twenty-five billion dollars worth of
food and pharmaceutical products.20  A sudden shortage or elimina-
tion of these basic items could threaten the health of many in the
Russian population and lead to severe political unrest.
Second, declining oil production poses a threat to other domestic
industries which rely on relatively inexpensive and dependable access
to fuel.  Currently, Russia produces just enough oil to supply its do-
mestic industries and export the remaining small amount.  If Russia’s
oil production falls any farther, however, it will be faced with the dif-
ficult choice of either denying domestic industry the fuel it needs or
defaulting on foreign loans.
The two keys to increasing Russian oil production are (1) refur-
bishing and expanding the existing infrastructure and (2) increasing
exploration.21  Both infrastructure and exploration suffered during
the 1980s when Gorbachev neglected to reinvest profits from exports
back into the oil industry.  Instead, oil revenues were used to subsi-
dize other, less profitable industries and to purchase desperately
needed consumer goods.22  Faced with a lack of reinvestment capital
and increasing demands from the Soviet central planners, oil manag-
ers were forced to cut costs.  Understandably, they chose to reduce
spending in the areas which needed the least amount of immediate
attention: infrastructure and exploration.23
17. See Skelton, supra note 11, at 26.
18. See Gorst & Rumyantsev, supra note 2, at 3.
19. ‘93 Crude Export Slide is Foreseen by Russia, PLATT’S OILGRAM NEWS, Nov. 23, 1992,
at 1.
20. See G. Bruce Knecht, Low on Fuel, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug. 21, 1992, at 30.
21. The needed infrastructure includes pipelines, roads, refineries and ports.  See id.
22. See C.I.S. Oil Woes Laid at Feet of Underspending for Exploration, OIL & GAS J., May
4, 1992, at 44.
23. Id.
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The lack of infrastructure maintenance has resulted in massive
waste and loss due to leaky pipelines and outdated drilling tech-
niques.24  Some have speculated that as many as one million barrels of
Russian oil are spilled each day due to poor infrastructure.25  Equally
severe, the lack of investment in exploration has led to a twenty-five
percent decline in oil exploration from 1989 to 1992.26
Foreign investors can provide the capital and cutting-edge tech-
nology needed to revitalize the infrastructure and initiate explora-
tion.27  Investors have already begun considering major undertakings
to repair and rebuild the oil infrastructure.  Neste, a Finnish oil com-
pany, is currently in negotiations with Russian authorities  to build a
“Baltic Oil Pipeline” which would deliver 700,000 barrels of crude oil
a day from the Timan-Pechora basin to the Russian port of Primorsk
where additional pipes would take the oil to Finnish refineries.28
Other projects include constructing a new port on the Barents Sea
that would ultimately be the point of departure for an estimated two
billion barrels of oil.29  Parties interested in this project include Tex-
aco, Norsk Hydro, Amoco and Exxon.30
B. Benefits to Foreign Investors
Foreign investors want access to Russia’s massive oil reserves.
Experts have estimated that sixty billion barrels of oil, or 7 percent of
the world’s total oil reserves, are located within Russia’s borders.31
While these estimates are impressive, they are based only on regions
which have been explored and do not factor in the potential for oil
discovery in Russia’s vast, unexplored regions.  Some analysts have
argued that tapping Russia’s unexplored regions would reveal oil re-
serves rivaled only by those found in the whole of the Middle East.32
By gaining a foothold in Russian oil production, foreign investors
would nearly be assured a steady flow of oil for decades.
24. See Knecht, supra note 20, at 32.
25. See Peter Nulty, The Black Gold Rush in Russia, FORTUNE, June 15, 1992, at 126, 127.
26. See C.I.S. Woes, supra note 22, at 44.
27. See Gorst and Rumyantsev, supra note 2, at 3.
28. See id. at 4
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See Skelton, supra note 11, at 26.
32. See generally Yevgeny Pavlov, Time to Reflect and Time to Drill: The First Should
Come First, BUSINESS MN, January 17, 1996, at 7, available in LEXIS, News Library (reporting
on the findings of an academic panel at a conference entitled “Fundamental Challenges Facing
Oil and Gas Production” organized by the Russian Academy of Sciences).
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In addition to commercial rewards, foreign investment in Rus-
sian oil could yield political benefits.  For example, a healthy Russian
economy with close ties to the West would most likely enable a mod-
erate government to stay in power, thereby reducing national security
concerns in Europe and Scandinavia.  Additionally, the establishment
of a steady flow of Russian oil to Europe and the U.S. would reduce
European and American dependence on the oil-producing countries
of the Middle East.33
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT LEGAL
ENVIRONMENT
Despite the enormous benefits foreign investment could bring to
both Russia and foreign investors, most large-scale projects have died
in the negotiation stage due to Russia’s hostile legal environment.
Because there is no definitive law governing investment in Russian
oil, foreign investment projects are subjected to a body of
“conflicting, overlapping, and rapidly changing laws, decrees and
regulations which tend to support an ad hoc and unpredictable ap-
proach to doing business, and which often apply on a retroactive ba-
sis with no grand fathering provisions.”34  Two laws on foreign in-
vestment have served as the foundation for this confusing and ever-
expanding legal morass.
The Law on Foreign Investment was drafted in 1991 to attract
and regulate Western capital and technology desperately needed by
Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union.35  The law has failed to
achieve its stated goal of attracting investment, however, because its
broad provisions do not extend the certainty and protection most in-
vestors require before committing substantial investment capital.
Specifically, the Law on Foreign Investment neglects to shield inves-
tors from extremely high risks associated with a lack of centralized
authority, a patently hostile tax regime and exposure to subsequent,
supervening legislation.
The Law on Subsoil was drafted in 1992 to apply specifically to
foreign investment in natural resources.  Although it contains several
33. See Vaughan, supra note 6, at 822-823.
34. Nat’l Trade Data Bank, Russia-Country Marketing Plan FY’93, MARKET REP., Jan. 15,
1993.
35. The preamble of the Law on Foreign Investment states: “This law . . . is aimed at at-
tracting and making effective use of foreign material and financial resources, advanced foreign
techniques and technology, and management experience in the national economy of the
[Russian Federation].”  Basi, supra note 13, at 42 n.61.
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provisions intended to facilitate investment, the Law on Subsoil fails
to correct the problems created by the Law on Foreign Investment.
A. The Law on Foreign Investment
1. Overlapping Federal and Local Authority.  For over seventy
years, federal and local authorities in Russia have struggled for
control of Russia’s oil.36  When the Soviet Union collapsed, local
authorities began boldly to assert ownership rights to the oil in their
territories.37  Unwilling to challenge these claims, federal lawmakers
have tacitly agreed to a system of overlapping jurisdiction.38  Under
the current arrangement, both the federal and local governments
have power to regulate foreign investment while neither has an
incentive to coordinate its legislative efforts with the other.  As a
result, investors are exposed to tax laws, regulations, excise fees and
licensing requirements at both the federal and local levels that often
contradict or duplicate each other.  For example, an investor might
be required to pay a 20 percent “land use” tax to the federal
government as part of an exploratory drilling project only to learn
that the local authorities also require a 20 percent “land use” tax.  In
other words, because there is no coordination between federal and
local authorities, the investor would have to pay “rent” to two
landowners for the same piece of land.  Even worse, nothing
precludes the local authorities from passing a “land use” tax ex post
facto and applying it to the same project after drilling has begun.
The Law on Foreign Investment fails to provide investors with a
definitive policy because it explicitly leaves local authorities with
overlapping power to regulate foreign investment within their terri-
tory.  The preamble states that “the provisions of this law operate on
the territory of the Russian Federation with respect to all foreign in-
36. See Conine, supra note 1, at 329.  Historically, all mineral resources, including oil, were
assumed to fall under the jurisdiction of local authorities.  In the 1930s, the Communists took
control of all mineral resources under the theory that local governments had “delegated” their
authority to the Supreme Soviet.  Somewhat surprisingly, local officials during the Communist
period made occasional attempts to wrest control over petroleum operations from the central
ministries.  Then, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and concomitant demise of centralized
authority, local governments “asserted that they alone could authorize exploration and devel-
opment and were entitled to the financial benefits due the state.”  Id. at 339.
37. See id.
38. Even the Russian Constitution is hopelessly vague with regard to who has authority
over natural resources.  See, e.g., KONST. RF art. 9.1 (1993) (“natural resources shall be used
and protected in the Russian Federation as the foundation of life and the activity of the peoples
living in the corresponding territory.”).
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vestors and enterprises with foreign investments.”39  At first glance,
this provision could be read as an assertion of federal authority over
all investment activity “on [Russian] territory.”  Under this interpre-
tation, the Law on Foreign Investment would supervene local laws
attempting to regulate foreign investment.  Upon closer inspection,
however, it becomes clear that the drafters did not intend this result.
In fact, the drafters left the system of overlapping authority firmly in
place.  Article 38 of the Law states that foreign investment in land or
natural resources is subject to the National Land Code and “other
legislative enactments in force on the territory of the Russian Federa-
tion.”40  “Other legislative enactments” is sufficiently broad to en-
compass the myriad of laws, taxes, regulations, and fees enacted by
assertive local governments.  Thus, the investor who is able to meet
all federal regulations must additionally contend with the unchecked
regulatory power left in the hands of local authorities.41
2. Taxes.  The Russian tax regime is the most daunting legal
obstacle to foreign investment.  The Law on Foreign Investment
refers potential investors to the tax laws in force in the Russian
Federation.42  This is unacceptable for two reasons.  First, tax laws in
Russia have a history of changing rapidly and second, the current tax
burden on foreign oil investors is egregiously oppressive.43  Foreign
investors can expect to pay “local taxes of 10 to 20 percent, a tax on
profits from which wages cannot be deducted, a 28 percent VAT, a 40
percent income tax, an oil export tax of $5.50 a barrel, a mineral use
tax, a mineral rehabilitation tax, an excise tax, tariffs on imported
goods and port usage taxes.  In the unlikely event that a profit is still
being realized, a profit repatriation tax is also imposed.”44
Of all the Russian taxes, the export tax has been singled out by
foreign investors as the most significant threat to profitable invest-
ment in Russia.45  Although the IMF suggested the export tax on oil
39. Law on Foreign Investment,  supra note 7, at 1 (emphasis added).
40. Id.
41. See infra Part IV.C.3. for further discussion on the risks future, supervening legislation
poses to foreign investors.
42. Law on Foreign Investments, supra note 7, art. 3.
43. See Anne Imse, American Know-How and Russian Oil, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1993, at
28.
44. Id.
45. See Andrei A. Konoplyanik & Nikolai N. Lisovsky, Russia Aims for Favorable Climate
for Joint Ventures, OIL & GAS J., Aug. 10, 1992, at 19.
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as a means to reduce Russia’s budget deficit,46 it has had exactly the
opposite effect.  Because the export tax has made it nearly impossible
for foreign investors to realize a profit, they have held back the in-
vestment funds desperately needed by the Russian government to re-
duce the budget deficit.  Instead of repealing the export tax, however,
the government issued Decree No. 497 on May 19, 1994 which allows
exemptions for foreign oil producers in certain circumstances.47  To
date, almost all major oil joint ventures have proceeded contingent
on receiving an exemption to the export tax.48
3. Exposure to Changing Legislation.  According to Yuri
Petrov, head of the State Investment Corporation (SIC), “change of
legislation is the biggest risk facing potential investors.”49  As
discussed above, investors in the oil industry are at the mercy of
changing legislation both at the national and local levels.  Because
the Law on Foreign Investment fails to address this issue, President
Yeltsin established the SIC with the express purpose of protecting
investors from changing legislation.50  The SIC was endowed with 787
billion rubles to establish a fund for compensating those investors
who could prove that their investment loss was proximately caused
by changing legislation.51  While the intention is good, the creation of
the SIC has failed to attract investors or alleviate their fears of
changing legislation because the SIC has very limited funds at its
disposal, and proving that changing legislation is the only cause of
business failure would be very difficult in most situations.52  Thus,
although the government seems to recognize the concerns foreign
investors have regarding changing legislation, it has failed to take
effective steps toward minimizing or alleviating the risks.
46. See Imse, supra note 43, at 3.
47. See Kaj Hobér, A Game Called Russian Oil: Trading Oil in the FSU-Recent Develop-
ments, 13 J. ENERGY. & NAT. RESOURCES. L. 96, 105  (1995).
48. Notable examples include Polar Lights, White Nights, Amkomi, Siberian-American
Oil Company, KomiArcticOil and Chernogorskoye.  Id. at 107.
49. Basi, supra note 13, at 47.
50. See id. at 47.
51. See id. at 46.
52. Assuming the current exchange rate which fluctuates between 4000 and 5000 Rubles
to the dollar, the SIC would have between US $150-200 million dollars with which to compen-
sate foreign investors.  While this may be sufficient to cover smaller investments, initial oil in-
vestments routinely exceed US $1 billion.  See Basi, supra note 13, at 42 n.61.
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B. The Law on Subsoil
The Law on Subsoil did not settle the issues of authority, taxes
and exposure to changing legislation.53  However, the law does make
one important advance toward the establishment of  a more accept-
able legislative climate for foreign investors.  The Law on Subsoil
provides for the use of concession and PSA contracts in conjunction
with a licensing system to stabilize the investment environment and
to attract foreign capital.54  For purposes of this Note, however, the
Law on Subsoil is important because it sets the stage for the passage
of the Law on Production-Sharing Agreements.
IV.  THE RUSSIAN PRODUCTION-SHARING LAW
A. History
On December 24, 1994, President Yeltsin encouraged foreign in-
vestors by signing Decree No. 2285, “on Production Sharing Agree-
ments For The Use of Underground Resources.”55  Although the De-
cree did not establish PSA contracts as a legal form of investment,
investors regarded it as a “goodwill gesture” and an indication that
substantive legislation would follow.56  The investors were correct.
Very soon after the decree, both the Economic Policy Committee of
the State Duma (Duma) and the Ministry of Fuel and Energy
(Ministry) began preparing drafts of legislation that would finally
raise Russian investment options to world standards and attract des-
perately needed foreign capital.
Both the Duma and the Ministry completed drafts of a PSA law
by early 1995.  While both drafts created a legal basis for production
sharing, the Duma draft was far more friendly to foreign investors.57
For example, the Duma draft contemplated a new, more flexible sys-
tem for the granting of development rights.  In contrast, the Ministry
draft left unchanged the rigid system of tender offers found in the
53. For example, the Law on Subsoil sets out a system whereby authority over the assign-
ment of development rights and other regulatory functions are to be shared equally by the fed-
eral and local governments “in the interest of the people.”  See Conine, supra note 1, at 429.
54. See id.
55. See Mikhail Y. Galyatin, A Hazy Future for the Law on Production-Sharing Agree-
ments, PATTERSON, BELKNAP, WEBB & TYLER LTD. NEWSL. (Moscow, Russia), 1996, at 3 (on
file with the Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law).
56. See Hobér, supra note 47, at 100.
57. See id.
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Law on Subsoil.58
More importantly, the Duma version provided for a tax structure
characteristic of typical PSA legislation.  In a PSA, the foreign inves-
tor pays the host government a share of the oil produced in lieu of
taxes.59  The percentage of oil the state receives should total in value
that which the state would have received from income, VAT, export
and other taxes.  Under the Duma’s draft the government would ac-
cept oil for taxes and release the investor from further tax liability.60
The Ministry’s draft, on the other hand, included a long list of “taxes,
duties, charges, deductions to social funds and other payments, thus
firmly anchoring the foreign investor to the Russian tax system.”61
The Ministry’s draft added nothing new to the existing legal frame-
work for oil production.  While foreign investors could call their
agreement a “production sharing agreement,” they would have been
forced to navigate through the existing system of tender offers, li-
cences and full exposure to a hostile tax regime.
In a victory for investors, the Duma draft prevailed and was sent
to the Federation Council for ratification.62  The victory was short
lived, however, because the Federation Council vetoed the law.  Af-
ter an unsuccessful attempt by the Duma to overturn the veto, the
draft law was sent to a Settlement Committee to seek out a compro-
mise.63  After two months in the Settlement Committee, the Duma
proposed a watered-down version of their original draft on Decem-
ber 6, 1995, and sent it to the President to be signed into law.64  After
hearing arguments from supporters and opponents of the law, Presi-
dent Yeltsin signed the Law on Production-Sharing Agreements on
December 19, 1995, stating that, in his opinion, “a bad law is better
than none at all.”65
B. Typical PSA Laws
PSA laws enable the state and the investor to conclude PSA con-
tracts.  PSA contracts have been used since the 1960’s to attract for-
eign investment in the oil industries of countries such as Indonesia,
58. See id.
59. See infra Part IV.B. for a more detailed discussion on the mechanics of a PSA contract.
60. See Hobér, supra note 47, at 100.
61. Id.
62. The Federation Council is the upper house of the Russian Parliament.
63. See Galyatin, supra note 55, at 2.
64. See id.
65. Id.
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Egypt, Libya, the Philippines, Peru, and Kenya.66  Typical PSA con-
tracts protect foreign investors by enabling them to contract around
the hostile legal environments often present during times of eco-
nomic or political turmoil.67
The foreign investor contemplating an oil project and the host
state negotiate a contract enumerating all the rights and obligations
of the parties which are then enforceable in either international arbi-
tration or the courts of a third country.68  When oil is produced, the
foreign investor is allotted enough oil to cover the costs of the project
(Cost Oil), and whatever is left is divided between the foreign inves-
tor (Profit Oil) and the host state (Government Take) according to a
pre-determined percentage negotiated in the PSA contract.69
The principal feature of a PSA contract, however, is that it is en-
tirely self-contained.70  By concluding a self-contained contract, the
foreign investor is able to obviate the existing legal environment and
acquire guarantees of certainty and protection directly from the host
state.  Similarly, the host state benefits by attracting foreign invest-
ment while maintaining control over the specifics of large-scale oil
projects.71  In addition, the state maintains title over the subterranean
resources throughout the process of exploration and extraction.72
This is different from other popular forms of oil contracts such as
concession agreements where the state actually transfers ownership
of the subterranean oil to the foreign investor.73
C. The Key Problem with Russia’s PSA Law: No “Self-Contained”
Contract
An investor who concludes a PSA contract with Russia will not
have the benefit of a self-contained agreement.  In fact, most key
provisions of the law expressly refer back to existing legislation.74
66. See Conine, supra note 1, at 362.
67. See id.
68. See Giudetta C. Moss, Petroleum Investments in Russia: Newly Enacted Law On Pro-
duction-Sharing Agreements Does Not Solve All Problems 2 (Jan. 10, 1996) (on file with Tran-
snational Juris Publications, Inc.).
69. See Smith & Dzienkowski, supra note 10, at 28.
70. See Skelton, supra note 11, at 26.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See Ernest E. Smith, From Concessions to Service Contracts, 27 TULSA L.J. 493, 527
(1992).
74. The following areas are expressly exposed to existing legislation: foreign control and
use of land (art. 1.2), licensing (art. 2.2), modification of the agreement (art. 17), termination
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Thus, any contract formed pursuant to PSA law will be shackled to
the same problems foreign investors face under the current legislative
environment.  Because the PSA law does not allow for self-contained
contracts, the investor must face three familiar problems: (1) over-
lapping federal and local authority, (2) hostile taxes and (3) super-
vening legislation.  In addition, the PSA law fails to offer an adequate
system for resolving disputes.
1. Overlapping Federal and Local Authority.  As discussed
above, overlapping authority exposes the investor not only to existing
laws which may duplicate or conflict with each other, but to changing
legislation as well.  Attempting to mitigate these risks, the drafters of
the PSA law included a stability clause in Article 17.2.  The stability
clause states that “in the case that changes in federal or local
legislation has a negative effect on the economic result of an investor’s
project, the terms of the agreement shall be modified so that the
investor may obtain the same economic result which would have
resulted in the absence of any legislative changes.”75  While the
stability clause is, in theory, an innovative solution to the problem of
overlapping authority, it is too vague to mitigate investors’ concerns.
The stability clause neglects to define “negative effect” and
“economic result” thereby leaving their meaning to be interpreted by
Russian authorities.  Even if the authorities agree with the investor
that the “economic result” is that a particular project has experienced
a “negative effect” due to changing legislation, the PSA law does not
describe how the agreement may be “modified” to protect the inves-
tor’s profit margin.  Presumably the drafters intended the investor to
set off the damages incurred by changing legislation against the gov-
ernment take of the produced oil.  If this is the case, then the investor
is only protected from local taxation and fees up to the amount of the
government take.  In the conceivable scenario that a local or federal
authority imposes regulations which amount to more than the gov-
ernment take, the investor is left without recourse.
2. Taxes.  Article 13.1 of the PSA law contemplates a
traditional PSA structure where the investor pays the host state a
percentage of the oil (government take) produced in lieu of taxes.76
                                                                                                                                     
(art. 21), cost recovery (art. 8), calculation of profit tax (art. 3.2) application of the VAT tax
(art. 13.3), accounting procedures (art. 14.1), state immunity (art. 23).  See Moss, supra note 68,
at 5.
75. Law on Production Sharing Agreements, supra note 12, art. 17.2 (emphasis added).
76. See id. art. 13.1.
STOLESON FINAL MACRO 12/10/97  4:23 PM
684 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 7:671
However, paragraphs two through five show the Ministry’s influence
on the final, compromised PSA law by requiring the investor to pay
income taxes, VAT taxes, bonuses, royalty payments, and payments
for the use of land in addition to the government take.77  These are
the same taxes applicable to foreign investors under the Law on
Foreign Investment.  In fact, Article 13.2 expressly states that income
taxes levied against the investor will be regulated by Russian law.78
Not only is the investor exposed to income taxes which may be as
high as thirty-two percent,79  but his taxable income must be derived
using Russian methods of accounting.80  This requirement forecloses
the possibility of designating mutually agreeable accounting methods,
such as the international General Accepted Accounting Principles,
within the terms of the PSA agreement.  Instead, the investor is
bound to a system of accounting used exclusively in the Soviet Union
during communism.
In addition to the income tax, the investor must pay a value
added tax, or VAT, which is essentially a tax on the incremental
value the foreign investor’s services add to the final product of ex-
portable oil.81  Included in the determination of “value added” are the
goods and services the foreign investor must utilize to produce the fi-
nal product.  The VAT is an especially lucrative tax for the Russian
government in light of Article 7.2, which mandates that the investor
give preferences to Russian products, services and technology.  Un-
der 7.2, the investor must not only use Russian contractors, producers
and suppliers “when all other conditions are equally met,” but must
also stipulate in the PSA contract to using a “minimum percentage of
technological supplies that must be purchased in Russia.”82  Thus the
investor is forced to purchase goods and services in Russia under Ar-
ticle 7.2 which are then subject to the VAT tax under Article 13.3.
The investor may recover the VAT taxes paid only if oil is found
and produced.83 According to 13.3, when an investor begins producing
77. See id. arts. 2-5.
78. The first line of article 13.2 states: “    ! " 
, " " 		 
.” [Tax on profit is paid
by the investor in the order established by the laws of the Russian Federation].  This is the typi-
cal form the drafters used throughout the PSA law to refer back to the existing Russian legal
structure.
79. See Vaughan, supra note 6, at 826.
80. See Law on Production-Sharing Agreements, supra note 12, art. 14.1.
81. See id. art. 13.3.
82. Moss, supra note 68, at 9.
83. See Law on Production-Sharing Agreements, supra note 12, art. 13.3.
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oil, he may deduct VAT taxes paid from the total government take.84
Not surprisingly, this element of the PSA law heavily favors Russia
and simply adds another bureaucratic hurdle for investors.  To illus-
trate, if investor A signs a PSA contract with Russia, his VAT liabil-
ity for the first month of operations may be X.  A year later, when oil
is found and produced, the investor may recover only the current
value of X which has most likely dropped significantly due to double
digit inflation.  While the investor may recover VAT taxes paid, the
ultimate amount will be much less and the effort expended to recover
the money from the Russian government could be substantial.
Similar to taxes, the investor who signs a PSA agreement is sub-
ject to existing legislation in the area of export duties and tariffs.85
Article 9.2 states that investors may export oil without limitations
“except those found in the Law on Foreign Investment.”86  One of the
“limitations,” however, gives the government power to impose
“export tariffs, quotas and licence fees” at will.87  Thus, when the gov-
ernment uses its authority under the Law on Foreign Investment to
raise tariffs and license fees on all foreign investments, it also unilat-
erally modifies any tariff or license fee structure negotiated in PSA
contracts.
3. Future, supervening legislation.  In the areas of tax, export du-
ties, and dispute resolution, the PSA law is anchored firmly to exist-
ing Russian legislation.  More damaging to foreign investment, how-
ever, is the fact that the investor is exposed to future, supervening
legislation which could destroy a profitable venture.  Nothing in the
PSA law restricts the Russian government from using the legislative
powers granted under the Law on Foreign Investment and the Law
on Subsoil to raise income taxes or export duties.88  Thus, the inves-
tor’s profit margin under a PSA contract is constantly at the mercy of
new legislation.  This is especially dangerous considering that both
federal and local governments have a Constitutional right to raise
taxes or enact new ones at will.89
84. See id.
85. See id. art. 9.2.
86. Id.
87. See Moss, supra note 68, at 10.
88. See id.
89. Compare Konst. RF art. 132.1 (1993) (giving local authorities authority to “manage
municipal property” and “establish local taxes and levies”), with id. art. 75.3 (stating that the
Federal government may establish a “system of taxes to be collected for the federal budget.”).
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4. Dispute resolution.  The PSA law also links dispute
resolution to existing Russian law.  Under Article 22, the government
and investor may stipulate that disputes will be submitted to either a
Russian court of ordinary jurisdiction or to international arbitration.
Because the PSA law is so closely tied to Russian law, the investor
can expect that even in international arbitration, the controlling
substantive law will be Russian.  Nevertheless, investors would most
likely prefer international arbitration over the risks of partiality they
could face in Russian courts.
Before submitting a dispute between a state and private party to
international arbitration, the state must waive its sovereign immu-
nity.90  Without a waiver, sovereign states such as Russia will often re-
sist limitations on their autonomy, making it difficult for private par-
ties to compel arbitration and enforce awards.91  Recognizing this
concern, the drafters of the PSA law included Article 23, which
authorizes Russia to waive its sovereign immunity in PSA contracts
with foreign investors.  The effect of this provision should not be
overstated, however, because Article 23 continues to say that any
limiting of sovereign immunity must be done in connection with ex-
isting Russian law.  However, no such law exists.92  A law enabling
Russia to waive its sovereign immunity is currently being reviewed in
Parliament, but until it is passed, Article 23 of the PSA law is useless
to investors.
V.  RECOMMENDATIONS
A sophisticated and well-drafted PSA law would remove signifi-
cant barriers to foreign investment in Russian oil.93  For the PSA law
to work, however, at least three steps must be taken.  First, the PSA
90. See generally David D. Caron, The Nature of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal and the
Evolving Structure of International Dispute Resolution, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 104, 113 (1990); see
also Joanne K. Lelewer, International Commercial Arbitration as a Model for Resolving Treaty
Disputes, 21 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 379, 396 (1989).
91. See Lelewer, supra note 90, at 386.
92. See Moss, supra note 68, at 17.
93. While a PSA law would eliminate or at least reduce barriers resulting from the legal
environment, other significant barriers to investment remain.  Investors are reluctant to rely on
the Russian pipeline network, which is not only in desperate need of repair, but also runs
through former Soviet republics, such as Azerbaijan, which are now independent and often
hostile to Russia’s interests.  Another constant barrier is the threat of political turmoil.  One
need only recall, for example, that Russian tanks faced each other in front of the “White
House” in a stand-off for political control less than four years ago.  See Sonni Efron, Yeltsin
Calls in Troops After His Foes Rampage in Moscow and Rout Police, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1993,
at A1.
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law must allow the state and foreign investors to conclude self-
contained agreements.  This could be accomplished by (1) redacting
vague references to the “laws of the Russian Federation” in the pro-
visions of the PSA law, and (2) adding a supremacy clause stating
that any PSA contract is subject only to the PSA law and the terms of
the PSA contract.94  Once PSA contracts are disengaged from existing
laws, Russian authorities and foreign investors will be empowered to
establish taxes, export duties, mechanisms for dispute resolution, and
other specifics relating to a given project within the terms of the PSA
contract.
Second, Russia’s PSA law should borrow provisions from suc-
cessful PSA laws enacted in other countries and adapt them to the
Russian context.  Most PSA laws designate a specific percentage
(ranging from thirty to fifty percent) of the total oil produced that the
investor may recoup as cost oil.95  Russia’s PSA law should do the
same because it gives the investor a powerful incentive to use the
most cost-effective means of recovering the maximum amount of oil.
If only thirty percent of the total oil produced may be allocated to
cover costs, the investor will only pursue projects which will yield
more oil with lower costs.  The downside is that investors may refrain
from the high-risk exploratory drilling which often result in discov-
eries of major reserves.96  However, with a sliding scale for cost oil,
the investor could receive an increased allocation, up to fifty percent,
depending on the relative difficulty of the project.
Other PSA laws also include a mechanism for calculating which
costs may be reimbursable by the cost oil.  Indonesia includes express
provisions indicating how to determine overhead, capital and financ-
ing costs and how they are to be offset by the cost oil allocation.97
Capital costs must be amortized, and then offset against the cost oil
by not more than 20 percent per year.98  This prevents the investor
from applying all the cost oil to recoup capital costs in the short term
94. However, for practical reasons, the PSA law should refer to the applicability of exist-
ing tort, environmental and criminal law to any contract concluded in Russia.  Conceivably, an
increase in environmental regulations detrimental to the profitability of an oil project could be
offset by the stability provision found in Article 17.2.
95. See Smith, supra note 73, at 531.
96. This is an acute concern considering that much of Russia’s oil may be located in Sibe-
ria, the Russian Far East and under the Caspian Sea.  Each of these regions presents unique
challenges to exploration efforts and will most likely require significant capital costs to begin
oil extraction.
97. See Smith, supra note 73, at 531.
98. See id.
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and insures that the remaining 80 percent will be available for wages
and taxes.  Russia’s PSA law does not designate a specific method of
calculating costs, but merely requires that whatever method is chosen
must not “contravene the laws of the Russian Federation.”99  The
drafters of Russia’s PSA law could afford the investor more certainty
by designating a sliding scale for the allocation of cost oil and a sys-
tem for calculating which costs are applicable.
Similarly, the drafters should designate a sliding scale for the al-
location of profit oil between the state and investor.  In both Kenya
and Nigeria, the host state receives a progressively larger government
take from the profit oil as the amount of daily production increases.100
For example, the government take from a project producing 20,000
barrels a day may start at 65 percent with the take increasing to 75
percent if production exceeds 50,000 barrels a day.101  The theory be-
hind this sliding-scale mechanism is to reward the state and not the
investor for an unexpectedly large discovery.102  A sliding scale may
also diminish the state’s temptation to seek modification of the PSA
contract due to changed circumstances.  This benefits the investor by
increasing certainty.  At least the investor can anticipate the amount
of increased government take resulting from a massive oil strike in-
stead of being in fear of unilateral modification or expropriation.
Third, the Russian government should pass legislation enabling
it to waive its sovereign immunity.  As stated above, the PSA law has
a provision allowing the state and the investor to choose international
arbitration as their means of dispute resolution.  This provision is
moot, however, unless Russia is able to waive its sovereign immunity
and be subject to the jurisdiction of a third party.
Following these three steps would improve the Russian PSA law.
While not removing all the barriers to investment, a PSA law which
allows the state and investors to conclude self-contained contracts,
borrows from other PSA laws, and facilitates the use of international
arbitration could make investment in Russia’s oil significantly more
attractive to foreign investors.  Furthermore, completing these steps
would bring Russia’s investment environment closer to those existing
in other oil producing countries, thereby making Russia a more vi-
able competitor for international oil investment funds.
99. Law on Production-Sharing Agreements, supra note 12, art. 8.
100. See Smith, supra note 73, at 532.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 533.  Left unresolved is the fact that a sliding scale could provide the investor
with an incentive to under-produce, thereby avoiding an increased government take.
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VI.  CONCLUSION
Russia needs foreign investment to boost sagging oil production
and attract desperately needed hard currency.  Foreign investors
want to invest but are hindered by Russia’s legal environment.103  A
sophisticated PSA law would allow investors to obviate the existing
legal morass and protect them from the threat of future governmen-
tal intrusion.  Unfortunately, Russia’s PSA law does neither.  In fact,
the PSA law expressly refers back to existing legislation and opens
the door for unilateral modification by future legislation.  While no
law can insure investment success, Russia’s PSA law, as currently
drafted, insures that investors will wait for a more secure investment
environment before committing a significant amount of  resources.104
If Russia neglects to repair the PSA law or overhaul its legal envi-
ronment, it may squander its potential to be a major oil producing
nation and threaten its progress toward a democratic future.
Mark A. Stoleson
103. The promise of a PSA law led several American oil companies including Amoco,
Exxon, Mobil and Texaco to begin negotiations with Russia.  The disappointing substance of
the law as passed, however, has caused several of the negotiations to stall, possibly indefinitely.
See The Americans Are Backtracking On Their Offers, BUSINESS MN, Jan. 17, 1996, at 5, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library.
104. See id.
